Cross-CRP Synthesis of the ISPC’s Observations on Management and Governance Arrangements of CRP Proposals by CGIAR Independent Science and Partnership Council
1 
 
 
 
25
th
 October 2011 
 
 
A cross-CRP synthesis of the ISPC’s observations on Management and 
Governance arrangements of CRP proposals  
 
Summary 
 
In its 5
th
 meeting the Fund Council suggested that the ISPC, having reviewed all the 
submitted CRP proposals, was in a good position to review the CRP management and 
governance arrangements and to present a synthesis of the cross-CRP management constructs 
for the consideration of the Fund Council.  Three of the common criteria used in the ISPC’s 
review of CRP proposals are partnership management (#4), appropriateness and efficiency of 
management (#5) and accountability and efficiency of governance (#6). This synthesis builds 
on the ISPC’s qualitative assessment of these criteria. This meta-level synthesis highlights 
common features, shortcomings and potential risk areas perceived in the governance and 
management arrangements described in the proposed CRPs with regard to the CRPs' quality 
of science, role and strategic engagement of partners and, in general, ability to deliver on 
CRP objectives.  
 
The concept for CRPs was to align research with a clear focus on four System-level 
development outcomes (SLOs) and for enhancing the likelihood of impact through 
partnerships. They were also deemed necessary to augment disciplinary or sectoral 
approaches and to be instruments of change for the CGIAR in seeking synergies and 
efficiencies in operation. Against the general guidance for management and governance 
structures given in the Strategy and Results Framework, the CRPs proposed a range of 
mechanisms, some of which the ISPC deems functional and others with risks, particularly 
regarding the ability of the CRPs to move away from the status quo and become genuine 
instruments of change.  
 
Overall, the ISPC is of the opinion that the biggest challenge to assuring that the long term 
leadership and management of CRPs is as effective as possible is to institute greater 
independence in key decision making and oversight functions; a more nuanced and 
transparent approach to estimating and supporting effective management; and the capacity to 
link the long term goals for the CRPs to a management structure that anticipates strong 
partnerships and new ways of working.  
 
Purpose 
 
At the time of writing, the first full cycle of CRP proposals has been submitted to the Fund 
Council, making it possible to look across the CRPs to compare the proposed management 
structures. Fifteen different programs can be expected to generate differing strategies for 
achieving effective management and oversight.  Nevertheless, within those strategies it 
2 
 
should be possible to see common goals for the programs’ management and oversight, if not 
identical mechanisms for achieving them. 
 
The CGIAR created CRPs as the instruments for aligning research and extending impact 
through partnerships.  This review is an opportunity to consider how the larger intent of the 
CRPs is supported by the ways in which the programs will be managed.  Although the 
transition to a new funding structure will take time, it would be valuable if, from the start, 
management and oversight facilitated the transition to new ways of collaborating and 
achieving results, and introduced operating principles and practices that support effective 
management and oversight of these complex entities. 
 
Among the issues considered in the review is the extent to which the proposed structures: 
 Enable the CRP to establish a coherent identity as a program as it aligns research 
activities and mobilizes resources  
 Lead to new partnerships and new models of partnerships 
 Shift the center of gravity away from the institutional interests of the Centers and 
more towards the impact-oriented cultures of the CRPs 
 Balance the role and influence of the Centers within a more robust partnership 
structure 
 Increase confidence in priority setting and resource allocation among partners and 
donors 
 Streamline operations 
 Assure accountability for results 
 
The measures and indicators used in the review to test whether a program’s proposed 
management structure would contribute to, or inhibit, achieving these results are drawn from 
the experience of the CGIAR system and the Centers over the last decade in building more 
effective governing and advisory bodies, and in working collaboratively with each other and 
with partners. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the proposed structures for each of the CRPs and includes brief notes on 
relevant characteristics.  Tables 2 and 3 summarize the extent to which a CRP has an 
oversight or management structure that has the potential to strengthen the long-term 
performance of the CRP. The information in the tables is drawn from the draft proposals 
presented to the Fund Council and from the ISPC’s initial commentaries.  In the case of three 
proposals, the changes made to their management arrangements in response to earlier ISPC 
and FC reviews have been incorporated:- CRP3.3 (GRiSP) refined the balance of Center and 
outside perspectives on its Oversight Committee and also provided a clearer description of 
the continuing role of IRRI in the CRP’s management; CRP7 (Climate change, agriculture 
and food security) focused the relationship between the  Independent Scientific Panel and 
CIAT to emphasis its links to CIAT’s board; CRP5 (Water, land and ecosystems) modified 
the program’s steering committee to include independent expert advice.  With those 
exceptions, the proposals used in the review are ―original‖ in the sense that they reflect 
limited outside review and, consequently, provide a good window into the variety of 
prevailing theories about workable structures that emerged at a crucial stage in the proposals’ 
drafting. 
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Guidance to CRP proponents provided in the SRF 
 
Two prevailing concepts appear in the CRPs that broadly influenced program management 
and oversight.  The first is the clear articulation of the legal responsibilities and role of the 
lead Center.  The second is the value placed on a management structure that is ―light‖—by 
making use of existing managerial capacity, minimizing bureaucracy, and holding the 
percentage of funding allocated to support new management costs to a minimum.  This 
emphasis on lean management is difficult to argue with on its surface, but it encouraged 
management units that were too small to be effective and programs that were more expensive 
to manage than they appeared.   
 
The current guidance appears in the Strategy and Results Framework, submitted by the 
Consortium Board to the Fund Council in February 2011.  It recommends the following 
components for the governance and management of CRPs (p76): 
 A lead Center with fiduciary and operational responsibilities for implementation, 
 A Director of the CRP, responsible for the quality and relevance of the program’s 
outputs, 
 A planning and management committee comprising representatives of the lead 
Center, each of the participating Centers, and other partners with substantial 
responsibilities in implementing the CRP, and  
 A scientific advisory committee, which reports to the planning and management 
committee, to ensure that the work in the CRP is of the highest quality. 
 
Within the recommended framework, the CRPs reflected a wide variety of arrangements.  All 
preserved the role and legal standing of the lead Center and its board, and maintained a direct 
reporting relationship with the Consortium Board for accountability purposes.  Only a few 
established a structure within the CRP that provided oversight of the program that was 
independent of the Centers’ own management or that had either formal or informal access to 
the lead Center’s board.   
 
Although the guidance from the Consortium Board provides for a management committee 
and a scientific advisory body, the composition of the former emphasizes the primary role of 
the Centers in a CRP’s management, and the reporting relationship of the latter is viewed 
primarily as an input to management.  If Centers adopt a narrow interpretation, the 
recommendations have the potential to create a closed loop for oversight and accountability 
purposes.  While the guidance on the matter of governance and management invites outside 
and independent perspective into CRPs, it also provides a rationale for limiting this 
perspective to the management rather than the governance level of the Centers. 
 
Not every CRP chose to adopt this model or interpret it so narrowly.  A number of CRPs 
(CRP3.3, GRiSP; CRP3.4, Roots, tubers and bananas; CRP 3.7, Milk, meat and fish) 
proposed scientific advisory bodies with members that overlapped with the lead Center’s 
board, specified an annual report to the board, or stipulated that one of its meetings coincide 
with that of the board.  A few loaded the dice in the favor of outside and potentially new 
perspectives rather than protect the ―ownership‖ of the Centers.  The majority of the CRPs 
stuck to the recommended structure, with the weakest resulting in a structure where the 
scientific advisors are a ―pool‖ to be deployed one or two at a time to advise program 
management (CRP3.5, Gain legumes; CRP3.6, Dryland cereals). In reality, these scientific 
advisory bodies have no real governance ―teeth‖. 
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Observations 
 
The following observations are grouped to reflect the central structural elements that appear 
consistently in the proposals.  They also refer to the issues identified at the beginning of the 
review that link structure to the qualities and characteristics that support the programs’ 
effectiveness. 
 
CRP coherence and identity  
 The management structures are heavily weighted to preserve the role and prerogatives 
of the Centers.  This may be rationalized as a necessary aspect of the transition from 
one set of funding relationships to the other but there is little evidence in the proposed 
structures that, as the CRPs develop, the Centers will recede in favor of programs with 
management coherence and a strong identity.  It does the opposite – it puts in place a 
structure that allows continuous resistance of change.  Centers are often fully 
represented in multiple settings—in steering committees, management committees, as 
observers on scientific advisory boards.  A few notable exceptions stand out—CRP1.3 
(Aquatic agricultural systems), CRP2 (policies, institutions and markets), and CRP3.7 
(Meat, milk and fish)—accommodating meaningful independent perspectives through 
means that promise to be of significant value to the programs.  Giving Centers equal 
and dominant roles in program management may appear to create transparency and 
reduce conflict among the participating Centers, but it is more likely to maintain the 
status quo and slow the full realization of the intended innovations central to the 
conception and intent of the CRPs. 
 The ―light‖ management units and the reliance on the existing capacity of the Centers 
to provide management services may streamline ―backroom‖ functions like financial 
and contract management, HR and technology, but they starve the CRP of being able 
to marshal and manage the partnership strategy, engage in resource mobilization and 
create coherent communication programs.  The risk is that the CRPs reinforce a 
―supply driven‖ nature of the research agenda. The last two areas are of particular 
importance in establishing a strong identity for a program.  While the management 
units appear to have small budgets, the costs will still occur, just out of sight and 
under circumstances that are likely to be inefficient for the program but satisfying for 
the Centers. More intensive CRP management could deliver better integration 
between the components of the CRP, which currently appear parallel in some CRPs. 
 The priority and value assigned to ―light‖ management structures are also likely to 
handicap the integration of existing research activities into the coherent research 
objectives envisioned in the CRPs.  The proposals frequently cite the perpetuation of 
silos or the inability to manage new partnerships effectively as risks. Nevertheless, 
with notable exceptions (CRP1.3 and CRP3.7), the management units have neither the 
capacity nor the mandate to manage these risks, as they are often staffed solely by a 
director with small administrative support.  Achieving balance among participating 
Centers receives more attention in the formation of research management teams than 
skills in leading or managing change, and as noted below, CRP Directors are given no 
clear role in recruiting these managers, facilitating their development of new skills, or 
in evaluating their performance.    
 
Balancing Partners and Centers 
 Partners are given places on key management structures—steering and management 
committees—only in theory.  More often, all of the Centers in a CRP are clearly 
represented in a decision-making setting, like a Steering Committee, but there is room 
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for partners at that level only if they demonstrate a financial or programmatic 
commitment judged to be commensurate with the Centers.  Centers have long 
standing partnerships in place but very few are mentioned by name in the context of 
populating the management structures.  Partners and stakeholders can be found 
included in advisory structures but these are not typically the settings where priority 
setting and resource allocation occur.  Over the long run, as bi-lateral and restricted 
funding to Centers unwinds and declines, the crude equivalence between bringing 
money to the table and exerting influence on the program should diminish in favor of 
building structures that value and make use of knowledge, networks, and influence.   
 
Increase confidence in decision making/assure accountability 
 Of fifteen proposals, eleven lacked a structure that offers an independent and effective 
mechanism for program oversight, including evaluation, priority setting and resource 
allocation.  The exceptions are noted in the review and are highlighted in Table 1.  
The CRPs prefer to keep everyone with a vested interest in an authoritative role 
within the management structure.  While such an arrangement may reduce the 
potential for conflicts among Centers about priority setting or resource allocation, it 
does so at the expense of allowing other donors and partners to feel confident that 
decision making is driven by the best interests of the program.  
 The periodic assignment of responsibility for commissioning evaluations is often left 
vague and may suffer when there is no reporting relationship to a lead Center’s board 
(the instances where links with the governing body are in place are noted in Table 2).  
The examples of good oversight bodies stand out, giving outside perspectives a strong 
position in the structure and permission to be of value. 
 CRP Directors do not get much scope or encouragement to build a research 
management team.  Although there is every reason to fill research management 
positions with the scientists already at work in a similar or identical assignment within 
a Center, the CRP Directors are not given the tools to manage these ready-made staff 
for performance.  The Director is not given a role in evaluating research team 
members or in recruiting new members as the program evolves or vacancies occur. 
Furthermore, research managers are also not given much room to succeed - with 
sometimes only 25 or 30 percent of their time budgeted for management 
responsibilities. 
 
Streamline operations/increase budgetary transparency 
 The value proposition for developing leadership and management of the CRPs is 
distorted.  Several CRPs do not appreciate the need to budget explicitly for 
management. CRP3.1 (WHEAT) and CRP3.2 (MAIZE) made a case that the direct 
management costs be covered by the Fund Council and, in doing so, held those costs 
to a mere 2-4% of the budget with little to show for that investment.  Emphasis is on 
percentages rather than the adequacy of management. Modest percentages can still 
yield significant resources for management.  Nevertheless, neither proposal describes 
a management unit with any specificity given the estimated expense, nor staffing 
levels commensurate with the complexity of the program.  In both cases, these CRPs 
chose to dispense with a Program Director completely (unless some current CIMMYT 
staff position will perform this function). 
 Because common sense dictates that a range of management activities will continue to 
be provided by the Centers, the CRP budgets do not reflect the full cost of program 
management.  Of greater concern over the long term is the inability to assess whether 
the programs are managed in a cost effective manner or if significant redundancies in 
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capacity exist.  Because several Centers—CIMMYT, ICARDA, AfricaRice and IRRI, 
in particular—will align their entire research agendas within a relatively small number 
of CRPs, a review of their current management budgets provides an indirect path to 
estimating the full costs of program management for the first few years of the CRPs 
working at comparable scales.  
 In the past years, a lot of attention has been placed on improving the effectiveness of 
CGIAR Center governance. The reduced volume of traditional governance tasks that 
will occur as a Center’s research portfolio migrates to CRPs may argue for smaller 
boards and relying on the new formulations of program committees possible for the 
CRPs through more robust engagement of new perspectives and outside experts.  This 
path may provide opportunities to improve effectiveness and reduce overall costs of 
management and governance within the new CGIAR. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Many of the Centers already have experience in managing large programs involving multiple 
partners. Some examples of good practice from this experience have been incorporated into 
some of the CRPs. The ISPC recognizes the challenges ahead in managing these multi-
partners programs for delivery impact and would encourage the Consortium Board to 
facilitate further cross-CRP review of CRP governance, management arrangements and 
practices once the implementation phases are underway, to continue the sharing of best 
practice and in support of the CGIAR reform.  
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Table 1 – Principal Management and Advisory Structures 
 
Table 1 highlights management bodies that function as settings for the DGs, their equivalents or deputies of the primary Centers and partners to gather.  
These bodies typically review priorities and resource allocations and play a role in conflict resolution.  Also listed in Table 1 are advisory bodies with 
varying degrees of independence and authority, but with the potential to bring a measure of objectivity in combination with expertise and an ―outsiders‖ 
perspective.  A number of CRPs organized their management structures to create or enable independent oversight.  These are highlighted.  
 
CRP Steering or equivalent  
Leadership and composition 
Science/Partnership Advisory 
Composition 
CRP1.1 Dry Area 
systems 
Steering Committee 
ICARDA DG—chair  
9+1 Centers/SSA CP 
Weighted representation, other partners/stakeholders, 
criteria not identified 
Independent Scientific Advisors: 4 members 
Regional Stakeholder Advisory Committees 
CRP1.2 Humid tropics Steering Committee 
IITA DG—Chair 
7+3 Centers/Primary Partners 
R4D Advisory Committee: 8 members + IITA DG + 2 DG 
observers 
CRP1.3 Aquatic 
agricultural systems 
Program Oversight Panel (balanced oversight body, majority not Center affiliated) 
Chair is selected from independent POP members 
8 members + WorldFish rep +  a Center DG 
CRP2 Policies, 
institutions, and markets 
Science and Advisory Panel (independent oversight body) 
Chair and members appointed by IFPRI board 
9 members total 
CRP3.1 WHEAT Management Committee 
Co-chairs-CIMMYT and ICARDA research directors 
Members: program leaders from CIMMYT and 
ICARDA, representatives of primary research partners 
Oversight Committee: 6  regional members, CIMMYT and 
ICARDA DGs and chair of the Management Committee 
CRP3.2 MAIZE Management Committee 
CIMMYT Research Director, chair 
10 or fewer members--Research Directors + regional 
and program leaders from primary research partners 
(projected to be 5 initially organizations) 
Oversight Committee: No size given 
Experts from diverse partners + 1 representative each of primary 
research partners 
CRP3.3 GRiSP Program Planning and Management Team 
Members—DDG Research or equivalent of IRRI, 
Oversight Committee: 9 members-4 external experts, 5 IRRI, 
AfricaRice, CIAT board members 
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CRP Steering or equivalent  
Leadership and composition 
Science/Partnership Advisory 
Composition 
AfricaRice and CIAT + 3 partners + Program Director IRRI/AfricaRice DGs ex officio 
CRP3.4 Roots, tubers 
and bananas 
Steering Committee 
CIP DG, chair 
DGs of CIP, CIAT, Bioversity, ITTA 
Application/approval of additional members 
+Program Director, ex officio 
Science Advisory Committee: 5-6 members 
Appointed by Steering Committee 
CRP3.5 Grain legumes Steering Committee 
ICRISAT DG, chair 
12 members (approximately), DGs or equivalents of 4 
participating Centers and principal partners with 
―selected representation‖ of other organizations 
R4D Advisory Panel: A ―pool‖ of 6-10 advisors used individually 
CRP3.6 Dryland cereals Steering Committee 
ICRISAT DG, chair 
12 members, DG or equivalents of ICRISAT and 
ICARDA and major partners 
R4D Advisory Panel: A ―pool‖ of 6-10 advisors used individually 
CRP3.7 Meat, milk and 
fish 
Science and Partnership Advisory Committee 
Members—Internationally recognized scientists, development partners and private sector representatives to address science 
relevance, partnership strategy, exert influence  
CRP4 Nutrition and 
health 
Planning and Management Committee 
Chaired by ILRI DG for two years, convened by 
Program Director 
7 + chair 
3 representing Centers/partners, 4 research theme 
leaders 
Independent Advisory Committee: 6 members 
CRP5 Water, land 
ecosystems 
Steering Committee was merged with Science and Impact Advisory Council to create a more balanced management body.  
The revision was in response to the ISPC commentary on an earlier proposal, and included in the 24/09, 2011 proposal. 
Co-chaired by IWMI DG and independent member 
Proposed size not indicated. Original structures included 9 member Steering Committee and 6 member Advisory Council.  
CRP6 Forests, trees and 
agroforestry 
CIFOR DG 
4 Centers + 4 ―outside‖ members (financial 
commitment to program a criteria for inclusion in SC 
Scientific and Stakeholder Advisory Committee: No size indicated 
Chair to be elected from among SSAC members 
CRP7 Climate change, Independent Scientific Panel—responsibility for planning, evaluation, resource allocation 
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CRP Steering or equivalent  
Leadership and composition 
Science/Partnership Advisory 
Composition 
agriculture and food 
security 
Chair + 9 members + 3 observers (CIAT board member + ESSP and Center rep) 
 
 
Table 2 -- Composition and structure of the advisory bodies   
 
 
CRP 
 
Title 
 
Reports to 
 
Links to Lead Center Board 
 
Leadership 
 
Structure 
CRP1.1 Dry 
Area systems 
Independent 
Scientific 
Advisors 
Steering Committee No Not indicated 4 members 
No terms 
30-45 days a year 
CRP1.2 
Humid 
tropics 
R4D Advisory 
Committee 
Steering Committee 
CRP Director 
Annual report Chair, nominated by 
committee 
8 members 
3 yrs x 2 
Nominated by committee 
CRP1.3 
Aquatic 
agricultural 
systems 
Program 
Oversight 
Panel 
WorldFish Board 
 
POP attends one WF Board 
mtg. 
DG or board member sits on 
POP 
Chair, appointed by WF 
Board 
May not be a Center DG 
or a member of WF 
Board 
8 members 
3 yrs x 2 
Chair has 2 yr term 
CRP2 
Policies, 
institutions, 
and markets 
Science and 
Advisory 
Panel 
IFPRI Board Formal annual report 
Regular chair to chair 
communication 
Chair appointed by 
IFPRI board 
9 members 
3 yrs 
CRP3.1 
WHEAT 
Oversight 
Committee 
CIMMYT No No chair 9 members 
3 representing CIMMYT and 
ICARDA + 6 representing regions 
No terms 
CRP3.2 
MAIZE 
Oversight 
Committee 
CIMMYT No No chair No size given 
Experts from diverse partners + 1 
representative each of primary 
research partners 
CRP3.3 Oversight IRRI, AfricaRice, Annually to each board Chair elected from 9 members,  
10 
 
 
CRP 
 
Title 
 
Reports to 
 
Links to Lead Center Board 
 
Leadership 
 
Structure 
GRiSP Committee CIAT boards among external experts 
on OC 
2 each from IRRI and AfricaRice 
boards, 1 from CIAT board, 4 
external experts 
IRRI and AfricaRice DGs are ex 
officio 
CRP3.4 
Roots, tubers 
and bananas 
Scientific 
Advisory 
Committee 
CIP Board 
Management 
Committee 
Annual report to full CIP 
Board 
Chair (no clear 
appointing authority) 
5-6 science and development 
experts 
No terms 
CRP3.5 
Grain 
legumes 
Scientific 
Advisory 
Panel 
Research 
Management Team 
No No 6-10 experts called upon 
individually for advice 
1-3 yr. appointments 
CRP3.6 
Dryland 
cereals 
Scientific 
Advisory 
Panel 
Research 
Management Team 
No No 6-10 experts called upon 
individually for advice 
1-3 yr. appointments 
CRP3.7 
Meat, milk 
and fish 
Science and 
Partnership 
Advisory 
Committee 
Program Planning 
and Management 
Committee 
ILRI DG and Board 
Annual report to ILRI Board 
 
Report/advise to ILRI DG 
No Size not indicated 
Program Director to lead formation 
No terms 
CRP4 
Nutrition and 
health 
Independent 
Advisory 
Committee 
Planning and 
Management 
Committee 
No Not indicated 6 members 
3 scientists + 2 partners + member 
of Harvest Plus Advisory Board 
Nominations submitted to IFPRI 
DG by PMC 
CRP5 Water, 
land 
ecosystems 
Steering 
Committee 
IWMI Board  Co-chairs Size not specified.   
No terms for partner or independent 
members. 
CRP6 
Forests, trees 
and 
agroforestry 
Scientific and 
Stakeholder 
Advisory 
Committee 
Steering Committee No Chair Size not specified 
No terms 
CRP7 
Climate 
Independent 
Scientific 
CIAT Board Chair reports annually to 
CIAT board 
Chair 9 + 3 observers 
3 yrs x 2 
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CRP 
 
Title 
 
Reports to 
 
Links to Lead Center Board 
 
Leadership 
 
Structure 
change, 
agriculture 
and food 
security 
Panel CIAT board member is 
observer on ISP 
 
 
Table 3 – Program Leadership and Management 
 
All but two of the CRPs included a program leader of some kind.  The levels of authority varied, with some directors expected to provide intellectual as 
well as programmatic leadership, and to serve as the spokesperson or visible representative of the program.  Most of the program directors chair the 
CRP’s program management committee, although it is rare to see a program director given a role in selecting or shaping the quality of research 
management.  As the table indicates, the budget allocated to CRP management is not predictive of the size or scope of the program management unit—
some CRPs propose program management units that address CRP-level communications, partnership strategy, or resource mobilization for the same 
investment as a CRP with no apparent staff or function other than a program director and basic administrative support. 
 
CRP Leadership 
(title, duties) 
Size of unit Communications 
(in unit budget) 
Resource Mobilization 
(in unit budget) 
Budget 
a
 
(USD million) 
CRP1.1 Dry 
Area systems 
Leader 
DG-equivalent 
―world leading scientist‖ 
remain active in research (10%) 
 No No 
Partner/donor relations 
No direct costs included 
CRP1.2 
Humid 
tropics 
Director 
Coordinate/report 
Chair, Program Management Team 
Director + 
administrative 
No/IITA No $2.5 over 3 yrs. (2% of program 
costs) 
CRP1.3 
Aquatic 
agricultural 
systems 
Leader 
Overall manager 
Chairs Program Leadership Team 
Reports to POP 
Joint performance evaluation 
Leader + 3-5  Yes $3 over 3 yrs (5%) 
CRP2 
Policies, 
institutions, 
and markets 
Director 
Overall manager 
Chairs Program Management 
Team 
Director + 2 Not clear Not clear No direct costs included 
Program Management Team to 
recommend management budget 
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CRP Leadership 
(title, duties) 
Size of unit Communications 
(in unit budget) 
Resource Mobilization 
(in unit budget) 
Budget 
a
 
(USD million) 
CRP3.1 
WHEAT 
No CRP director 
Program management within 
CIMMYT office of research and 
partnerships 
Technology 
staff 
CIMMYT Not clear $4.5 over 3 yrs. (4%) 
$2.05 of total to global leadership 
and meetings. 
CRP3.2 
MAIZE 
No CRP director 
Program management within 
CIMMYT  research director 
Technology 
staff 
CIMMYT Not clear $6.5 over 3 yrs. (4%) 
$1.65 of total to global leadership 
and meetings. 
CRP3.3 
GRiSP 
Director 
Coordinator 
Lead member of Program Planning 
and Management Team 
Director + 2 IRRI Not clear $12.8 for 5 yrs. (3%) 
Program coord. expenses + 
communications 
(Capacity building, M&E, Gender 
budgeted separately) 
CRP3.4 
Roots, tubers 
and bananas 
Director 
Overall manager 
Chairs Management Committee 
Director + 3 Yes Not clear $8.7 for 3 yrs. (5%) 
CRP3.5 
Grain 
legumes 
Director 
Limited scope of management 
Chair, Research Management 
Team 
None 
described 
No No $2.4 over 3 yrs. (2%) 
CRP3.6 
Dryland 
cereals 
Director 
Limited scope of management 
Chair, Research Management 
Team 
None 
described 
No No $2.02 over 3 yrs. (3%) 
CRP3.7 
Meat, milk 
and fish 
Director 
Overall manager 
Chair, Program Planning and 
Management Committee 
Director + 3 Yes Yes $5.6 over 3 yrs. (6%) 
Includes staff/expenses for 
communications, and 
partner/resource development  
CRP4 
Nutrition and 
health 
Director 
Overall manager 
Convenes but does not chair 
Program Management Committee 
Director + 4 No Yes $4 over 3 yrs (2%) 
CRP5 Water, Director Director + 6 No Yes $13.3 over 3 yrs. (6%) 
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CRP Leadership 
(title, duties) 
Size of unit Communications 
(in unit budget) 
Resource Mobilization 
(in unit budget) 
Budget 
a
 
(USD million) 
land 
ecosystems 
Overall manager 
Chairs Management Committee 
CRP6 
Forests, trees 
and 
agroforestry 
Head 
Overall manager 
 
Not indicated 3 person unit but 
location in org. 
structure not 
indicated 
Yes $2.9 over 3 yrs. for coordination 
(1%) 
$2.4 for communication 
CRP7 
Climate 
change, 
agriculture 
and food 
security 
Lead 
Overall manager 
Chairs Program Management 
Committee 
Lead + 5 Yes Yes $4.6 over 3 yrs. (10%) 
a
 CRP budget information included a varying degree of specificity. 
 
